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弹性需求条件下供应链协作的批发价格机制研究
引用本文:叶飞,李怡娜,符少玲. 弹性需求条件下供应链协作的批发价格机制研究[J]. 工业工程, 2006, 9(5): 18-22
作者姓名:叶飞  李怡娜  符少玲
作者单位:华南理工大学,工商管理学院,广东,广州,510641;华南农业大学,经济管理学院,广东,广州,510642
基金项目:广东省自然科学基金 , 广东省自然科学基金 , 广东省软科学基金 , 广东省广州市哲学规划项目
摘    要:研究了一类由供应商与分销商组成的两级供应链在弹性需求下的协作机制设计问题.分析了供应商与分销商未进行任何协作时整个供应链的收益情况.在此基础上,对供应商与分销商进行协作时最优订货量与整个供应链的收益进行了分析.研究结果表明双方协作可以提高整个供应链系统的收益,但并不能保证合作各方的收益均会增加.为此,提出了一种基于不对称Nash协商模型的批发价格契约机制来协调合作双方的收益,并进行了数据模拟与综合分析.

关 键 词:供应链  弹性需求  批发价格机制  合作博弈
文章编号:1007-7375(2006)05-0018-05
收稿时间:2005-04-14
修稿时间:2005-04-14

Research on Supply Chain Wholesale Price Coordination Mechanism with Demand Elasticity
YE Fei,LI Yi-na,FU Shao-ling. Research on Supply Chain Wholesale Price Coordination Mechanism with Demand Elasticity[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2006, 9(5): 18-22
Authors:YE Fei  LI Yi-na  FU Shao-ling
Affiliation:1. School of Business Aolministration , South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510641, China; 2. College of Economics and Management, South China Agricultural University, Guangzhou 510642, China
Abstract:Coordination mechanism of a two-layer supply chain made, up of a supplier and a wholesaler under demand elasticity is studied in the article. The benefit of the whole supply chain without any coordination between supplier and wholesaler is analyzed. The benefit of the whole supply chain and optimal order quantity with the coordination between supplier and wholesaler are also proposed. The research result indicates that the benefit of the whole supply chain will increase with the coordination of the wholesale and supplier; however, the benefit of each party will not be certain to increase. Therefore, a kind of wholesale price mechanism to coordinate the benefit of both parties based on asymmetric Nash negotiation model is proposed. And the feasibility of the model is manifested by data simulation.
Keywords:supply chain   demand elasticity   wholesale price mechanism   cooperative game
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