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一种基于动态博弈的提高过程质量成效的新视角
引用本文:张月义,陈太义,宋明顺. 一种基于动态博弈的提高过程质量成效的新视角[J]. 工业工程, 2015, 18(5): 7-13
作者姓名:张月义  陈太义  宋明顺
作者单位:(中国计量学院 经济与管理学院,浙江 杭州 310018)
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71373249);浙江省软科学研究计划资助项目(2012C35036)
摘    要:人的因素是影响过程质量成效的重要因素。由于质量的事后验证性和过程的不易监控,企业所有者和生产性员工之间存在关于过程的信息不对称,导致生产性员工往往注重量,有选择性地忽视质。基于信息不对称理论,构建企业所有者和生产性员工之间质量“委托-代理”模型,从经济学视角讨论如何激励生产性员工增加质量投入,提高过程质量成效,对如何在实践中推广模型的应用给出若干建议。

关 键 词:过程质量  信息不对称  动态博弈  委托-代理  

A New Perspective for Improving Product Quality in Process Based on Dynamic Game Theory
Zhang Yue-yi,Chen Tai-yi,Song Ming-shun. A New Perspective for Improving Product Quality in Process Based on Dynamic Game Theory[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2015, 18(5): 7-13
Authors:Zhang Yue-yi  Chen Tai-yi  Song Ming-shun
Affiliation:(School of Economics and Management, China Jiliang University, Hangzhou 310018, China)
Abstract:Workers are key factors that affect product quality in process. Because of the asymmetric information between enterprise owners and their workers, with post verification feature of quality and not-easy-to-monitor process details, workers tend to focus on quantity and selectively ignore quality. Based on the asymmetric information theory, a principal agent model of product quality in process between enterprise owners and their workers is established and discussed from the perspective of economics and the effective ways to motivate workers in quality improvement, and finally several suggestions are given on how to promote the model's using in practice.
Keywords:
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