Utility Dependence in Correct and Fair Rational Secret?Sharing |
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Authors: | Gilad Asharov Yehuda Lindell |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
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Abstract: | The problem of carrying out cryptographic computations when the participating parties are rational in a game-theoretic sense has recently gained much attention. One problem that has been studied considerably is that of rational
secret sharing. In this setting, the aim is to construct a mechanism (protocol) so that parties behaving rationally have incentive
to cooperate and provide their shares in the reconstruction phase, even if each party prefers to be the only one to learn
the secret. |
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Keywords: | |
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