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Utility Dependence in Correct and Fair Rational Secret?Sharing
Authors:Gilad Asharov  Yehuda Lindell
Affiliation:1. Department of Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
Abstract:The problem of carrying out cryptographic computations when the participating parties are rational in a game-theoretic sense has recently gained much attention. One problem that has been studied considerably is that of rational secret sharing. In this setting, the aim is to construct a mechanism (protocol) so that parties behaving rationally have incentive to cooperate and provide their shares in the reconstruction phase, even if each party prefers to be the only one to learn the secret.
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