煤矿企业生产安全监管的新视角

本文通过非对称信息动态博弈模型的分析可知，在“政企不分”的生产机制下，政府的对煤矿企业的生产安全监管是“退化”的，即强监管型的概率会弱化，弱监管型的概率会强化。在“政企分开”的生产机制下，煤矿企业的生产安全与监管者的查处存在完全信息条件下的纳什均衡或混合纳什均衡。为此，政府应主要从如下方面着手建立有效的监管方式：①树立以人为本的科学发展观。②用制度化的方式加大查处，降低额外收入的诱惑。③对监管者也建立惩罚和激励相容机制。④减小国有煤矿企业的“社会负担”。

GAME ANALYSIS ON THE SAFETY PRODUCTION SUPERVISION OF THE COAL MINE ENTERPRISE

According to the analysis on unsymmetrical-information-dynamic game model, we could find out that in the circumstance of the existing producing mechanism, in which the functions between the government and the enterprise have not been definitely plotted out, the government has not paid enough attention to the safety production supervision of the coal mine enterprise. In the existing mechanism, the safety production of the coal mine enterprise and the supervisor's inspection have the Nash equilibrium or Mixed Nash equilibrium in the complete and perfect information condition. On the basis of the model, the effective supervising methods could be established that first of all, build the scientific idea of development for people; secondly, strengthen the inspection and reduce the lure of the extra-income; thirdly, establish an effective publishing and encouraging mechanism for the supervisor; fourthly, reduce the social burden of the coal mine enterprise.