Spatial strategies in a generalized spatial prisoner’s dilemma |
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Authors: | Yoshiteru Ishida Toshikatsu Mori |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Knowledge-Based Information Engineering, Toyohashi University of Technology, Toyohashi Aichi, 441-8580, Japan |
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Abstract: | Many strategies, such as tit-for-tat, have been proposed in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) in which the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is carried out repeatedly with two players. A spatial version of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (SPD) has been studied, where a player at each site plays the IPD game with all the players in the neighborhood. However, the strategies studied in the SPD consider the past actions of a single opponent only. We studied spatial strategies that depend on the configuration of actions taken by all neighbors (as opposed to conventional temporal strategies). Since generosity can be considered as a spatial strategy, we first investigate the generosity required when an action error is involved. We also propose several spatial strategies that outperform many others.This work was presented, in part, at the 9th International Symposium on Artificial Life and Robotics, Oita, Japan, January 28–30, 2004 |
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Keywords: | Prisoner’ s dilemma Spatial strategies Tit-for-tat Generosity Game theory |
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