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含储能参与的日前市场价值公平分配机制
作者姓名:舒征宇  王喜召  董超  王灿  邵浩然
作者单位:三峡大学电气与新能源学院,三峡大学电气与新能源学院,南方电网调峰调频发电有限公司(广东)储能材料有限公司,三峡大学电气与新能源学院,三峡大学电气与新能源学院
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(52107108),被动孤岛切换场景下单三相混联微网群低频减载控制策略研究,三峡大学,王灿
摘    要:现有的节点边际电价机制中,由于传统发电商具有市场操控力,当储能独立参与市场出清时,各发电商采取策略性报价,打压并挤占储能电站的市场份额,阻碍了储能电站参与市场出清,间接导致市场出清总成本增大。为此,文中提出一种包含传统机组以及储能电站参与的市场竞争机制。首先,分析现有市场结算机制的弊端以及阻碍储能参与市场出清的原因;其次,建立含储能参与的市场出清模型,采用样本均值近似求解二阶段随机规划模型;接着,基于VCG结算机制,提出适应储能参与的日前市场价值分配机制;最后,提出解决激励相容而造成的系统收支不平衡问题的策略。文中采用修改后的IEEE30节点为例,证明该机制满足激励相容、收支平衡以及削弱传统发电商的市场操控力等性质,同时储能的参与将会减小系统出清总成本,降低市场价格剧烈波动的风险。

关 键 词:电力市场  节点边际电价  激励相容  VCG结算机制  随机规划  收支不平衡
收稿时间:2022/12/8 0:00:00
修稿时间:2023/4/24 0:00:00

Equitable distribution mechanism of market value Day-Ahead with the participation of energy storage
Affiliation:College of Electrical Engineering and New Energy of China Three Gorges University,,,
Abstract:In the existing locational marginal price mechanism, due to the market manipulation power of traditional power generators, the market share of energy storage plants are suppressed and squeezed by each power generator adopting strategic, when energy storage independently participates in market clearing, where the participation is hindered of energy storage plants in market clearing indirectly, and in the total cost of market clearing is increased. In order to achieve this, it is suggested that competitive market system in which energy storage aggregators and conventional units can both participate in the paper. Firstly, the drawbacks and the reasons of the existing market settlement mechanism are analyzed why prevent energy storage keeps from participating in market clearing; secondly, a market clearing model with energy storage participation is developed and the stochastic programming model is solved using the Sample Average Approximation; then, the mechanism is proposed a day-ahead market value allocation based on the VCG settlement mechanism to accommodate energy storage participation. Finally, a plan is put forth to address the incentive compatibility-related system income and expenditure imbalance issue. Using the modified IEEE30 node as an example, it is demonstrated that the mechanism satisfies the properties of incentive compatibility, break-even, and weakening the market manipulation power of traditional generators, while the participation of energy storage in the market reduces the total cost of clearing and the risk of drastic fluctuations in market prices.
Keywords:electricity market  Node marginal electricity price  Incentive compatibility  VCG settlement mechanism  Stochastic programming  income and expenditure imbalance issue  
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