| 基于委托-代理理论的节能契约设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄鑫,陶小马,邢建武.基于委托-代理理论的节能契约设计[J].工业工程,2009,12(4):19-22. |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄鑫 陶小马 邢建武 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 同济大学,经济管理学院,上海,201804;广西大学,机械工程学院,广西,南宁,530004
2. 同济大学,经济管理学院,上海,201804 |
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| 基金项目： | 上海市科技发展基金软科学研究资助项目，广西省社科基金资助项目，广西大学科研基金资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 应用委托-代理理论,提出了在不对称信息下促使企业节能的委托-代理模型.基于这一模型,分析了对政府和企业之间的节能合同具有影响的因素和变量.结果表明,有些因素,如节能的边际产出和边际成本、风险规避因子对合同的设计具有影响.因此,政府应该在合同中提供某些激励措施和设定可观测的变量.
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| 关 键 词： | 委托-代理 节能契约 不对称信息 |
Design of Energy Saving Contract Based on Principal-Agent Theory |
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| Huang Xin,Tao Xiao-ma,Xin Jian-wu.Design of Energy Saving Contract Based on Principal-Agent Theory[J].Industrial Engineering Journal,2009,12(4):19-22. |
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| Authors: | Huang Xin Tao Xiao-ma Xin Jian-wu |
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| Affiliation: | Huang Xin1,2,Tao Xiao-ma1,Xin Jian-wu1(1.School of Economics & Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 201804,China,2.School of Mechanical Engineering,Guangxi University,Nanning 530004,China) |
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| Abstract: | With principal-agent theory,a principal-agent model for promoting enterprises to save energy under asymmetric information is proposed.Based on this model,factors and variables that have effect on the energy-saving contract between government and enterprises are analyzed.Results show that some factors,such as marginal output and marginal cost of energy-saving,and risk aversion,have effect on the contract design.Thus,the government should provide some incentive means and set observable variables in the contra... |
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| Keywords: | principal-agent energy-saving contract asymmetric information |
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