在线拍卖中托投标的监管博弈模型研究

针对在线拍卖中卖方实施托投标拍卖出现的欺诈行为,在考虑成本因素的条件下采用非合作博弈理论和方法建立了托投标监管博弈模型,并定量分析监管部门与拍卖方之间互相依存下的决策以及混合纳什均衡问题。通过该模型对拍卖网站监管方和拍卖方决策行为的研究,得出网站监管部门对卖者托投标的最优罚款系数解析式。

Supervision game of shill bidding in online auctions

In light of the shill bidding fraud by the seller in online auctions, this paper builds a supervi- sion game model for the shill bidding on the basis of non-cooperation game theory and method with the cost factors considered. It analyzes the possible strategies and the mixed Nash equilibrium when the supervision department and sellers are interdependent. With the research into the strategies by the regulatory authorities and the sellers, it has obtained the optimal penalty factor analytic formula that can be used as a guidance by the regulatory authorities in their punishment of the sellers who have cheated by shill bidding.