基于碰撞模型的LED代数旁路攻击

针对轻型分组密码LED提出了一种基于碰撞模型的代数旁路攻击。利用代数攻击方法建立密码算法等效布尔代数方程组,采集算法运行中泄露的功耗信息并转换为碰撞信息,并将碰撞信息转换成额外方程组,从而利用CryptoMiniSAT解析器求解密钥。实验结果表明:旁路碰撞信息可有效降低方程组求解的复杂度;已知明文条件下,利用2轮最少50%的随机碰撞信息,即可在158.5 s内恢复64 bit LED完整密钥。此外,该方法也可用于其他分组密码功耗碰撞分析。

Collision model-based algebraic side-channel attack on LED

This paper proposed a collision model-based algebraic side-channel attack on lightweight block cipher LED. Firstly, it described the algebraic representations of LED. Secondly, it measured the power leakages of LED on ATMEGA324P microcontroller by a digital oscilloscope, and transformed to deduce collision. Finally, the collision was expressed as algebraic equations, and it applied the CryptoMiniSAT solver to solve for the key. Experiments demonstrate that the collision of side-channel information can introduce new algebraic equations into attack, reduce the complexity of solving equations; in the known-plaintext scenario, 2 rounds collision information is enough to recover the 64 bit LED master key in 158. 5 s. The proposed method can be applied into the collision-based power attack of other block ciphers.