基于Moran过程的竞争性舆情信息的网络传播博弈模型

新的媒体环境下，在享受不同形式在线社交网络提供便捷信息互动渠道的同时，需要加强对信息传播的管理与引导，防止其发展成为负面舆情信息肆意滋生的温床。结合传统演化博弈论与复杂网络理论，提出了竞争性舆情信息的网络传播博弈模型，并理论分析了正面舆情信息传播占优的收益条件及群体规模；随后，结合实际案例，通过仿真实验对比分析三种博弈环境下网络舆情的演化特征。三种博弈环境下，正面舆情信息传播策略占优条件均与收益有关，弱选择情境对收益参数的要求最为严格；强、弱选择情景下策略占优的条件还与群体规模有关，且强选择情景对群体规模的要求更为严格。

Network game model of competitive public opinion information propagation based on Moran process

Under the new media environment, while enjoying the convenient information interaction channels provided by different forms of online social networks, it is necessary to strengthen the management and guidance of information dissemination to prevent it from developing into a medium for the wanton dissemination of negative public opinion information. Combining traditional evolutionary game theory and complex network theory, this paper proposed a network dissemination game model of competitive public opinion information, and theoretically analyzed the profit conditions and the group size of positive public opinion information dissemination. Then, combined with actual cases, this paper compared and analyzed the evolution characteristics of network public opinion under three game environments through simulation experiments. In the three game environments, the dominant conditions of the positive public opinion information communication strategy were all related to the income, and the weak selection scenario had the most stringent requirements for the return parameters; the conditions for the dominant strategy in the strong and weak selection scenarios were also related to the group size, the strong selection scenario had stricter requirements on the size of the group.