装备采购中线性激励合同的理论研究

在装备采购中，信息非对称使得军方无法正确了解企业的努力水平，从而给装备采购经济活动带来了道德风险。结合装备采购实际情况，提出了一种能够降低道德风险的线性激励合同设计方法，并利用委托代理理论对装备采购项目风险、代理人最佳努力水平以及激励合同中相关参数之间的关系等进行了分析，为装备采购合同制度改革提供了思路和理论依据。

The Theoretical Research on Linear Incentive Contract of Equipment Procurement

During the procurement of equipment,the army can't attain the true endeavour of the enterprise because of the asymmetric information,which brings the moral hazard.On the basis of the practice of equipment procurement,the paper puts forward a method of designing linear incentive contract to reduce the moral hazard, and analyzes the item hazard,the best endeavour of the agent and the correlation of parameters with the principal-agent theory.The research would provide theoretical according and idea for the reform of equipment procurement contract.