| Abstract: | An on‐site generator, such as CGS (cogeneration system), is considered to be an effective end‐use energy system in order to accomplish primary energy conservation, CO2 emissions mitigation, and system cost reduction; these characteristics will eventually improve the complete performance of an existing energy system in the future. Considering the drawback of installing an end‐use CGS for a customer possessing small or middle‐scale floor space, however, it is difficult to achieve those distinctive features because the thermal‐electricity ratio of CGS is not always in agreement with that of customer energy demand. In order to overcome that matching deficiency, it is better to organize an on‐site generator network based on mutual electricity and heating transmission. But focusing on some cogenerators underlying their behaviors regarding maximizing their own profits, this on‐site network, whose situation corresponds to a grand coalition, is not necessarily established because of each cogenerator's motivation to form a partial coalition and acquire its own profit as much as possible. In this paper, we attempt to analyze the optimal operation of an on‐site generator network and identify by applying the nucleolus of cooperative game theory the optimal benefit allocation strategy in order for the cogenerators to construct the network. Regarding the installation site of this network, the center of Tokyo city is assumed; the locational information includes floor space and so forth through a GIS (geographic information system) database. The results from the nucleolus suggest that all districts should impartially obtain benefit from organizing the network for the purpose of jointly attaining system total cost reduction. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Electr Eng Jpn, 150(4): 23–35, 2005; Published online in Wiley InterScience ( www.interscience.wiley.com ). DOI 10.1002/eej.20052 |
