考虑政府补贴和不同回收渠道的再制造闭环供应链最优决策研究

为研究政府分别实施再制造补贴和回收补贴下不同回收渠道对再制造闭环供应链的决策影响,建立以制造商为领导者,零售商和回收商为跟随者的闭环供应链的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,对比分析两种补贴方式下不同回收渠道的最优定价和回收策略。结果表明,补贴金额的多少会降低产品价格和批发价,刺激消费,提高回收率,增加闭环供应链上所有参与方的利润,而与补贴类别无关;当存在双回收渠道时,回收商与零售商之间回收的竞争强度影响产品售价、回收率和制造商的利润,而回收转移价格仅与补贴类型有关。最后,通过实例分析探讨不同补贴与不同回收渠道对闭环供应链的影响。

A Research on Optimal Decision Making of Remanufacturing Closed-loop Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidies and Different Recycling Channels

In order to study the influence of different recycling channels on the decision-making of the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under the government's implementation of remanufacturing subsidies and recycling subsidies,a Stackelberg master-slave game model in a closed-loop supply chain with manufacturers as leaders and retailers and recyclers as followers is established to compare and analyze the optimal pricing and recycling strategies of different recycling channels under two subsidy methods.The results show that the amount of subsidy can reduce product prices and wholesale prices,stimulate consumption,increase recycling rates,and increase the profits of all participants in the closed-loop supply chain,regardless of the type of subsidy.When there are dual recycling channels,the intensity of competition between recyclers and retailer for recycling affects product prices,recycling rates,and manufacturers'profits,while recycling transfer prices are only related to the types of subsidies.Finally,the impact of different subsidies and different recycling channels on the closed-loop supply chain is discussed through a case analysis.