考虑供电公司风险的激励性可中断负荷合同模型

考虑到供电公司的风险偏好及用户的可中断电量，应用委托代理及机制设计理论建立了一种用户类型离散的可中断负荷合同模型。分析和算例结果表明，无论供电公司的风险偏好如何，该合同模型均能引导用户披露真实信息，实现电力资源的有效配置，且供电公司能从中节约供电成本。因此，激励性可中断负荷合同不仅能提高用户需求弹性．还有助于供电公司回避市场风险。

A model for incentive interruptible load contract considering the risk of power supply company

Considering the risk preference of power supply companies and maximum interruptible power of customers, an interruptible load contract model for discrete customer types is established by use of the theories of principal - agent and mechanism design. The results of analysis and calculation example show that, whatever risk preference of the power supply may be, this contract can lead customers to voluntarily disclosure their true information and so the power resources can be efficiently allocated, and the power supply company can save cost. Therefore, the incentive inteiTuptible load contracts can not only improve customers＇ demand elasticity, but also helps power company to avoid market risk.