公共选择中的外部成本及降解策略

民主遴选机制作为中国特色的民主政治形式,在实践中面临着各种外部性带来的外部成本问题.该文从公共选择和制度经济的视角揭示了民主遴选一般机理,采用效用函数模型分析了外部性对人力资源配置的影响;采用博弈论方法分析了民主遴选中各参与主体及不同参与策略,得出个体收益与总体福利的支付矩阵,讨论了各种条件下选择行为的成本收益,阐明了外部成本的产生机制.经过分析,分别从明晰遴选产权等方面,提出了降解民主遴选外部成本的相应制度设计.分析表明,通过设计相关激励与约束制度来降解民主遴选过程中的外部成本,不仅对民主遴选有现实借鉴意义,而且对推动我国的民主政治进程也有一定的政策启示.

Institutional designs to reduce the external costs of democratic selection

The Chinese democratic selection mechanism must accommodate characteristics of Chinese society where it faces a variety of problems caused by external costs. Thus, this paper analyzes voting mechanisms from the viewpoints of public choice and institutional economics. The exterior impact on human resources was analyzed using the utility function model. Then game theory was used to analyze participating subjects in democratic selection to determine their different participation strategies. From this, a matrix of individual incomes and total welfare was derived. The authors discussed the income cost of selection behaviors under all conditions and explained the mechanisms producing external costs. Finally, an institutional design for reduction of external costs in democratic selections was proposed from the perspective of defining the right of democratic selection, etc. Analysis showed that properly designed incentives and restrictive mechanisms can decrease the costs of democratic selection. This not only has reference value for a democratic selection system, but also has political implications, giving a better understanding of future democratic options for our country.