成本分担机制下考虑品牌商誉的三级绿色供应链微分博弈

考虑产品绿色度和品牌商誉的动态性,引入价格加成系数刻画采购价格、批发价格和销售价格三者之间的关系,采用微分博弈研究由供应商、制造商和零售商组成的三级绿色供应链的投资策略与协调问题.探讨并对比分析集中决策模型、无成本分担契约的分散决策模型和有成本分担契约的分散决策模型的均衡结果,设计双边成本分担契约对供应链进行协调.研究表明:产品绿色度的最优轨迹具有两种变化趋势,由产品绿色度初始值和稳态值的大小关系决定;品牌商誉的最优轨迹具有3种变化趋势,由品牌商誉初始值和稳态值的大小关系决定;集中决策模型最优,有成本分担契约的分散决策模型对绿色供应链的帕累托改进有限,而在一定条件下,双边成本分担契约可以完全协调绿色供应链.此外,双边成本分担契约的成立条件和协调性与价格加成系数有关.

Differential game of three-level green supply chain considering brand goodwill under cost sharing mechanism

Considering the dynamic characteristics of product greenness and brand goodwill, price addition coefficient is introduced to describe the relationship among the purchase price, the wholesale price and the sales price, and the differential game is used to study the investment strategy and coordination of a three-level green supply chain composed of suppliers, manufacturers and retailers. The equilibrium results of the centralized decision model, the decentralized decision model without cost sharing contract and the decentralized decision model with cost sharing contract are compared and analyzed, and bilateral cost sharing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain. The results show that: The optimal trajectory of product greenness has two variation trends, which are determined by the relationship between the initial value and the steady value of product greenness; The optimal trajectory of brand goodwill has three trends, which are determined by the relationship between the initial value and the steady value of brand goodwill; The centralized decision model is the best, and the decentralized decision model with cost sharing contract has limited Pareto improvement on the green supply chain, while the bilateral cost sharing contract can fully coordinate the green supply chain under certain conditions. In addition, the conditions and compatibility of the bilateral cost sharing contract are related to the price addition coefficients.