基于信号博弈的包装企业品牌策略决策研究

为解决向食品制造商提供包装的包装企业面临的品牌策略决策问题，将消费者观察到的包装企业生产外包装的材质以及设计水平作为传递产品质量的信号，运用信号博弈理论，以包装企业与产品制造商得益最大为目标，研究并分析了合并均衡、分离均衡和混合均衡下的包装企业品牌策略结果。结果表明，不完全信息博弈下包装企业的最优品牌策略决策为：对高质量产品的制造商提供并实施混合均衡下的高档次品牌策略，对于低质量产品的制造商提供并实施分离均衡下的低档次品牌策略。对比完全信息博弈结果，包装企业的品牌策略能作为信号，传递且有效区分产品制造商的产品质量。虽然高档次的品牌策略能帮助制造商将低质量产品伪装成高质量产品进入市场，但这种情况下消费者买到高质量产品的可能性反而有所提高。

Brand Strategy Decision of Packaging Enterprises Based on Signaling Game Model

In order to solve the brand strategy decision problem of the packaging enterprises that provide packaging to food manufacturers, the material grade and design level of packaging are taken as the signals to convey the quality of the products. Using signal game theory, the brand strategy decision of packaging enterprises is studied and analyzed under merger equilibrium, separation equilibrium and mixed equilibrium with the goal of maximizing the profit of packaging enterprises and product manufacturers. Some valuable managerial insights are obtained. Under incomplete information game, the optimal decision of the packaging enterprise is to provide and implement high-end brand strategy under the mixed equilibrium for the manufacturers of high-quality products, and to provide and implement the low-end brand strategy under the separation equilibrium for the manufacturers of low-quality products. Comparing with the decision of complete information game, it is found that the brand strategy of the packaging enterprise can be used as signals to effectively distinguish the product quality of the product manufacturer. Although high-end branding strategies can help manufacturers disguise low-quality products, the possibility of consumers purchase of high quality products is increased.