引入投资决策的电力容量市场均衡分析

针对纯能量市场难以解决发电机组的固定成本回收问题，国外电力市场已开展了建立容量市场的实践，以市场化机制形成对机组补偿的价格信号，保障发电容量充裕性。文中从容量市场机制设计的角度出发，在考虑市场成员策略行为的前提下，对引入投资决策的电力容量市场进行了建模与均衡分析。首先，描述了容量市场的基本机理，针对容量市场的投资决策问题建立双层均衡模型，上层模型为寡头主体的最优决策模型，下层模型为容量市场出清模型；其次，利用最优性条件将双层模型转化为单层模型，运用分段线性化等方法实现模型线性化，得到混合整数线性规划问题；最后，基于中国某省的实际数据进行算例分析，深入探究了市场主体的策略行为，揭示了寡头主体抬价时的过度投资行为及其影响因素，提出限制项目竞标自由度的策略行为规制方法并验证了该方法的有效性。

Equilibrium Analysis of Power Capacity Market Incorporating Investment Decision

In view of the difficulty in solving the fixed cost recovery problem of generating units in the energy-only market, the overseas power markets have launched the practice of establishing capacity markets, forming price signals for unit compensation with a market-based mechanism to ensure the sufficiency of generating capacity. From the perspective of capacity market mechanism design, this paper conducts modeling and equilibrium analysis of the power capacity market with investment decision on the premise of considering the strategic behavior of market members. Firstly, the basic mechanism of capacity markets is described, and a two-layer equilibrium model is established for the investment decision problem of capacity markets. The upper model is the optimal decision model of the oligarch and the lower model is the capacity market clearing model. Secondly, the two-layer model is transformed into a single-layer model by using the optimality condition. While the model is linearized by piecewise linearization, the mixed-integer linear programming problem is obtained. Finally, based on the actual data of one province in China, this paper makes a case study of the strategic behavior of market players, reveals the excessive investment behavior and its influencing factors of the oligarch during bidding period, proposes a strategic behavior regulation method based on limiting the freedom of project bidding, and verifies the effectiveness of this method.