| Abstract: | R. L. Spitzer and J. Endicott (1978) proposed an operational definition of mental disorder that is a more rigorous version of the brief definitions that appeared in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-III (DSM-III) and DSM-III—Revised (DSM-III—R). The heart of their proposal is a translation of the concept of dysfunction into operational terms. J. C. Wakefield argues that their definition fails to capture the concept of dysfunction and is subject to many counterexamples. Wakefield uses his harmful dysfunction account of disorder (e.g., Wakefield, 1992), which interprets dysfunction in evolutionary terms, to explain both the appeal and the problems of Spitzer and Endicott's definition and to provide support for the harmful dysfunction view. Wakefield concludes that the failure of Spitzer and Endicott's sophisticated attempt at operationalization indicates that nonoperational definitions that use functional concepts must play a role in formulating valid diagnostic criteria. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved) |
