基于经济博弈的股东监督行为分析

股东监督行为的博弈分析表明,在对经营者实施监督的过程中,大、小股东之间存在多阶段的动态博弈过程。由于监督对象的“公共物品”特征,导致股东对经营者的监督不足,存在股东“搭便车”的倾向,并且这种不足随着股权的适当集中而减弱;而当公司股权适当集中,大股东主动承担对经营者的监督时,又容易造成大股东对小股东权益的侵占。因此,为保护小股东权益,在造就大股东的过程中,形成强有力股东监督机制的同时,必须强化对大股东的监管。

Analysis of Shareholder Supervision Based on the Ecnomics Game

Game analysis of shareholder supervision indicates that there are many dynamics game processes during different stages in major shareholders and minor ones when supervising the managers.Because of the "public commodity" feature,the shareholders lack supervision of the managers,which makes shareholders follow the successful ones.And this lack will weaken when the share right is concentrated.When the share right is concentrated properly,and major shareholders initiatively supervise the managers,the major shareholders will seize the minor shareholders' right.In order to protect minor shareholders and make major shareholders successful,meanwhile forming the powerful supervision system we must strength the supervision and management of major shareholders.