电力市场环境下发电机组检修计划调整机制初探

电力市场环境下发电机组检修计划的安排与传统电力工业运行管理体制下有很大的不同。由系统调度机构统一安排发电机组的检修计划与电力市场机制并不吻合，而由发电公司自主确定其所拥有的发电机组的检修计划则可能会对系统的安全可靠运行构成威胁。因此，研究适当的市场机制，在必要时对发电公司申报的检修计划进行调整以确保系统安全可靠运行，同时保证对所有的发电公司公平，是一个亟待解决的重要问题。文中对系统运行机构（如ISO）调整发电公司申报的机组检修计划的机制进行了较系统的研究。所提出的机制通过引入发电公司对维持其所申报的检修计划不被ISO调整的意愿支付(willingness-to-pay)，可以同时保证系统的安全可靠性和发电公司间的公平性，易于被发电公司接受。最后用一个算例说明了该方法的基本特征。

A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE REGULATION MECHANISM FOR MAINTENANCE SCHEDULING OF GENERATING UNITS IN THE ELECTRICITY MARKET ENVIRONMENT

The problem of determining an appropriate maintenance scheduling for generating units (MSUs) in the electricity market environment is quite different from that in the traditional power industry. The traditional approach for this employed by the system operator through a centralized optimization method does not match with the electricity market operation mechanism, while security and reliability problems could be arisen if the MSUs are determined by individual generation companies. With this in mind, it is very demanding to develop an appropriate market mechanism for regulating or coordinating the MSUs proposed by individual generation companies so as to maintain the security and reliability of the power system operation, while at the same time, to guarantee the fairness among all generation companies involved. In this paper, an effort is made for this purpose by requiring generation companies to submit both their MSUs and their willingness-to-pay for keeping their MSUs not being adjusted by the system operator such as the ISO. The proposed mechanism could well achieve the given two objectives, i. e. maintaining the security and reliability of power system operation as well as guaranteeing the fairness among generation companies. Finally, a numerical example is served for illustrating the essential feature of the proposed mechanism.