Central Asian gas in Eurasian power game |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Industrial Engineering South-Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran;2. Business Systems and Analytics Department, Distinguished Chair of Business Analytics, La Salle University, Philadelphia, PA 19141, USA;3. Business Information Systems Department, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, University of Paderborn, D-33098 Paderborn, Germany;4. Departamento de Economía Aplicada II and Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales Universidad Complutense de Madrid Campus de Somosaguas, 28223 Pozuelo, SPAIN;1. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada;2. Department of Systems Design Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada;3. Centre for International Governance Innovation, Waterloo, ON N2L 6C2, Canada;1. Roma Tre University, Italy;2. University of Ferrara, Italy;3. CERIS-CNR, Italy;1. Center for Energy Science and Technology, Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology (Skoltech), Bolshoy Boulevard 30, bld. 1, Moscow 121205, Russia;2. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, 65 Profsoyuznaya St., Moscow 117997, Russia;3. UC Energy Research Center, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Ave. Vicuna Mackena 4860, Macul, Santiago, Chile |
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| Abstract: | Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, various gas pipeline projects have been proposed to diversify transit routes and export markets of the landlocked Central Asian states. To evaluate the pipeline project's impact on the players' bargaining power, I apply the cooperate game theory to a quantitative model of the Eurasian gas trade and quantify the bargaining power structure via the Shapley value. Due to ample production capacities in Central Asia, I observe little strategic interaction between the West and China. Thus, demand competition with China is not necessarily a disadvantage for the West, and the Turkmenistan–China pipeline does not affect the impact of the westbound projects aiming Europe and Turkey. For Turkmenistan, i.e., the main supplier in the region, a link via the Caspian Sea to Turkey is the most beneficial westbound option. Although the projects carrying gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to Europe enjoy the European Commission's political support, they yield marginal benefits to the European consumers. Thanks to its transit position, Turkey collects a large share of the benefits in the East–West gas trade. |
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| Keywords: | Bargaining power Network Natural gas Central Asia China |
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