核心企业与配套企业协同创新的演化博弈仿真分析

论文运用Stackelberg博弈模型，对核心企业和配套企业协同创新进行分析，计算配套企业的最优努力程度，然后在此基础上计算出双方的收益矩阵，并考虑第三方企业的介入对双方选择策略的影响，最后采用数值模拟仿真的方法，以证实均衡点的演化轨迹。研究发现,一般情况下，配套企业与核心企业协同创新是 “双贏”的策略。而当集群中第三方企业的介入时，核心企业支付的技术补贴比率与配套企业承担的风险相当时，双方在协同创新处达到稳定均衡。最后提出对策建议。

An Evolutionary Game Simulation on the Core Enterprise and Its Supporter in Collaborative Innovation

The Stackelberg game model is applied to analyze the collaborative innovation among the Core enterprise and Its Supporter and to calculate the optimal effort of supporting enterprises, based on which the payoff matrix of the core enterprise and its supporter is calculated. Then the influence of selection strategy of the core enterprise and its supporters with the third party intervention is studied. The evolutionary trace of the equilibrium point is proved by adopting a numerical simulation. The research shows that collaborative innovation is a win-win strategy, and that the two sides in the collaborative innovation achieve stable equilibrium when there is intervention of the third party in the clusters and the technology subsidies ratio of core enterprise and the risk supporting enterprise bears is equal. Finally, the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward.