| Abstract: | The author examined a public goods (PG) dilemma with environmental uncertainty in a sequential protocol of play paradigm. Using a 5-person game, Experiment 1 examined provision point (PP) uncertainty and found that a certain PP requiring 3 contributors produced the PG more frequently than an uncertain PP of the same expectation that varied uniformly among 2, 3, and 4 contributors. Fixing PP at 3, Experiment 2 showed that PG provision rate was higher with a certain group size of 5 persons than an uncertain group size of the same expectation that varied uniformly among 4, 5. and 6 persons. Further analyses showed that a fear of wasting one's contribution and pessimistic beliefs of environmental uncertainty could have undermined contribution. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved) |
