| 遏制投保人逆向选择的不完美信息动态博弈分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 范广慧,马艳芬. 遏制投保人逆向选择的不完美信息动态博弈分析[J]. 黑龙江工程学院学报, 2009, 23(3): 78-80 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 范广慧 马艳芬 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 黑龙江工程学院,数学系,黑龙江,哈尔滨,150050 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 黑龙江省教育厅科学技术研究项目 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 以投保人在购买低风险保单过程中投保人与保险公司之间的博弈过程为研究对象，首先建立两者之间的三阶段不完美信息动态博弈模型；然后以命题形式给出该博弈模型的完美贝叶斯均衡，并用逆推归纳法对命题进行详细证明；最后通过对完美贝叶斯均衡点的定量分析，找出遏制投保人逆向选择的方法。
|
| 关 键 词： | 逆向选择 不完美信息动态博弈 完美贝叶斯均衡 |
Dynamic game analysis of imperfect information of restraining the insured's adverse selection |
| |
| FAN Guang-hui,MA Yan-fen. Dynamic game analysis of imperfect information of restraining the insured's adverse selection[J]. Journal of Heilongjiang Institute of Technology, 2009, 23(3): 78-80 |
| |
| Authors: | FAN Guang-hui MA Yan-fen |
| |
| Affiliation: | (Dept. of Mathematics, Heilongjiang Institute of Technology, Harbin 150050, China) |
| |
| Abstract: | The game process between the insurer and the insured is studied when the insured buys a low-risk policy. At first, a three-stage dynamic game model of imperfect information between them is constructed.Then the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game model in the form of a proposition is given, and the proposition is proved in detail by backward induction. At last, the author finds out the feasible ways to restrain the insured＇s adverse selection by analyzing quantitatively the perfect Bayesian equilibrium point. |
| |
| Keywords: | adverse selection dynamic game of imperfect information perfect Bayesian equilibrium |
| 本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
