Another look at sex stereotypes and social judgments: An analysis of the social perceiver's use of subjective probabilities.

Reexamined the findings of A. Locksley et al (see record 1981-28048-001) that Ss fall prey to the baserate fallacy when they make stereotype-related trait judgments and that Ss ignore their stereotypes when trait judgments are made in the presence of trait-related behavioral information. A replication of Study 2 by Locksley et al, using 99 undergraduates, was conducted to examine 2 issues: (a) the use of a normative criterion in comparison with Ss' judgments and (b) the level of analysis (group vs individual) of Ss' judgments. Results show no support for the baserate fallacy. When a Bayesian normative criterion was constructed for each S based on the S's own stereotype judgments and was compared with assertiveness judgments made in the presence of individuating information, there was no evidence that Ss ignored or underused their stereotypes as the baserate fallacy predicts. (35 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)