基于讨价还价博弈的ATO供应链零部件生产及补货策略

通过建立ATO供应链中最终产品制造商与其两个供应商间的讨价还价合作模型，研究了ATO供应链的零部件生产补货策略和相应的利润分配策略，并探讨了供应链中各合作主体议价能力对最优解的影响。研究发现，ATO供应链应随着最终产品销售价格的提高而增加零部件产量，随最终产品组装成本或零部件生产成本的提高而减少零部件产量；随着最终产品制造商对其中一个供应商议价能力的增强，该供应商零部件的转移价格及其利润会降低，而另外一个供应商的零部件转移价格和利润会提高;若最终产品制造商比另外一个供应商的议价能力强，其期望利润会得到提高，反之，则会降低。

Component Production and Replenishment Policy in ATO Supply Chain Based on Bargaining Game

A bargaining cooperative game model for assemble to order (ATO) supply chain composed of a final product manufacturer and two suppliers is proposed to study the component production and replenishment policy and the corresponding profit sharing policy. The effect of participants bargaining power chain on the optimal solution is analyzed. It is found that ATO supply chain should raise the component production with the rise of the final product price, and reduce it with the rise of assembly cost of finished product or production cost of components. With the improvement of the bargaining power of final product manufacturer to one supplier, the transfer price of components and profits of this supplier is reduced, while those of another supplier are increased at the same time. The expected profits of the final product manufacturer increase if its bargaining power is stronger than another supplier, and otherwise it reduces.