Stackelberg Strategies for Atomic Congestion Games |
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Authors: | Dimitris Fotakis |
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Affiliation: | 1. Dept. of Information and Communication Systems Engineering, University of the Aegean, 83200, Samos, Greece
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Abstract: | We investigate the effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games with unsplittable demands. In our setting,
only a fraction of the players are selfish, while the rest are willing to follow a predetermined strategy. A Stackelberg strategy assigns the coordinated players to appropriately selected strategies trying to minimize the performance degradation due to
the selfish players. We consider two orthogonal cases, namely congestion games with affine latency functions and arbitrary
strategies, and congestion games on parallel links with arbitrary non-decreasing latency functions. We restrict our attention
to pure Nash equilibria and derive strong upper and lower bounds on the pure Price of Anarchy (PoA) under different Stackelberg
strategies. |
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Keywords: | |
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