考虑公平偏好的 PPP 项目股权结构博弈研究

针对 PPP 项目中公共部门和社会资本间的博弈问题，引入 Fehr-Schmidt 行为模型刻画了社会资本的公平偏好，构建了 Stackelberg 动态博弈模型；通过逆向归纳法求解，得到纳什均衡下公共部门的最优股权分配比例和社会资本对项目最优特许价格；以广州市某 PPP 项目为例采用敏感性分析研究了相关参数变化对均衡解的影响，并得到管理学启示。结果表明:股权比例越高社会资本越倾向于提高特许价格，同时社会资本的公平偏好越高，政府部门应提高社会资本的股权比例。本研究可为解决现实 PPP 项目股权分配比例提供理论依据和决策参考。

Stackelberg Game Study on the Equity Structure of PPP Projects with Equity Preference

Aiming at the game between the public sector and private capital in PPP projects， the Fehr-Schmidt behavior model isintroduced to describe the fairness preference of private capital， and a Stackelberg dynamic game model is constructed. Throughbackword induction method， the optimal equity allocation ratio of public sector and private capital to the project’s optimal concessionprice under the Nash equilibrium is obtained. Then， a sensitivity analysis is conducted on a PPP project in Guangzhou to study theimpact of changes in related parameters on the equilibrium solution， and managerial insights are obtained. The results show that thehigher the equity ratio is， the more social capital tends to increase the concession price. In addition， the higher the social capitalbehavior preference is， the more government should increase the equity ratio of social capital. This research can provide a theoreticalbasis and decision-making reference for solving the actual problems of PPP project equity allocation ratio.