Cryptanalysis of a mutual authentication scheme based on nonce and smart cards |
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| Authors: | Da-Zhi Sun Jin-Peng Huai Ji-Zhou Sun Jian-Xin Li |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Key Lab of Computing and Communication Software of Anhui Province, School of Computer Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui 230027, PR China;2. School of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, Hei Longjiang 15000, PR China;3. Department of Electrical, Computer, and Systems Engineering, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180, USA;1. School of Computer Science and Technology, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300350, China;2. Tianjin Key Laboratory of Advanced Networking (TANK), Tianjin 300350, China;3. Biomedical Cybernetics Group, Biotechnology Center (BIOTEC), Center for Molecular and Cellular Bioengineering (CMCB), Technische Universität Dresden, Tatzberg 47/49, Dresden 01307, Germany |
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| Abstract: | To prevent the forged login attacks, Liu et al. recently proposed a new mutual authentication scheme using smart cards. However, we demonstrate that the attacker without any secret information can successfully not only impersonate any user to cheat the server but also impersonate the server to cheat any user. That is, Liu et al.’s scheme fails to defend the forged login attack as the previous version. Our cryptanalysis result is important for security engineers, who are responsible for the design and development of smart card-based user authentication systems. |
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