基于联合确定基数法的激励合同设计

提出一种基于联合确定基数法的激励合同模型,用以解决业主和承包商在合同谈判时的信息不对称问题.理论推导证明,在此合同框架下,承包商不仅会节约建造成本,且会在合同谈判中提出与实际成本相近的报价.通过实验探索承包商在风险环境下的报价行为,结果表明,在有较大期望获益且存在损失可能时,承包商的风险态度最易偏于冒险,而通过适当报价就能获得正向收益时,承包商的风险态度最为保守.讨论该结论在工程管理实践中的现实意义.

An incentive contract model based on combined defining base quota

An incentive contract model based on combined defining base quota is proposed. This model is to deal with the unequal information availabilities between owner and contractor in determining the target cost. The theoretical derivation shows that the new contract model would promote the contractor to quote a price in line with the actual project cost during the negotiation phase, and to do his best in saving cost during the construction phase. An experiment was made to verify the new model and understand the quoting behavior of contractors in risky situations. The experimental results indicate that the contractors may quote relatively low cost when they face opportunities for gains but still with losing probabilities, and they would like to demand relatively high cost when the gains are assured. Some suggestions to use the new model are presented in the paper.