| Abstract: | Most of the literature on oligopoly deals with profit-maximizing firms engaging in “static” repetitive games. As the number of firms increases, the Nash-equilibrium strategy for each Cournot oligopolist converges to the competitive solution. In a two-person, zero-sum differential game model of duopoly 1] we introduced dynamic elements and explored alternative entrepreneurial goals. The duopolists endeavor to outsell each other subject to a no-loss constraint; the saturation of present markets by past sales and the impact on future goodwill by current advertisement are handled through “state variables.” The differential game formulation 1, 2] offers two advantages: (a) near perfect information leads to frequent existence of pure strategy equilibria and (b) the use of optimal control theory facilitates the characterization of the time structure of an equilibrium. However, the two-person, zero-sum framework is too restrictive while a general theory for solving n-person, non-zero sum differential games has still not been developed 3, 4]. |
