存在盗版下信息产品的用户协同设计选择性研究

针对信息产品市场中是否存在盗版的情况,研究一个垄断正版厂商是否选择用户协同设计策略的问题。基于用户的个人理性和激励相容,依据厂商是否选择用户协同策略,分别建立信息产品市场中不存在盗版时的NS、NC模型与信息产品市场中存在盗版时的YS、YC模型。通过对模型结果进行比较分析发现:当厂商选择用户协同设计策略时,NC模型中厂商的利润始终高于YC模型中厂商的利润,且厂商的利润均随着用户协同设计努力水平的降低而降低;NC模型和YC模型中用户努力水平高低均与用户对正版产品的价值估值有关;最后,无论信息产品市场中是否存在盗版,厂商选择用户协同设计策略的市场占有率均低于厂商不选择用户协同设计策略的市场占有率。

The Selection of User Co-design for Information Products under Piracy

With piracy existing in the information products market, a monopoly manufacturer's selection of user co-design is examined. Based on the consumer individual rationality and incentive compatibility, as well as the basic utility model, according to whether the pirated products present in the information product market and the original manufacturers choose user co-design or not, four mathematical models, respectively, NS, NC, and are set up. By comparing the results of the four models the following conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, when manufacturers choose user co-design, monopoly manufacturer's profit in the NC model is higher than monopoly manufacturer's profit in the YC model, and monopoly manufacturer's profit decreases with the reduction of user's co-design efforts. Secondly, when the consumers' valuation to legitimate information products is small, the user's co-design efforts level in YC model is higher than the user's co-design efforts level in YC model. When the consumers' valuation to commercial information products is large, the user's co-design efforts level in YC model is lower than the user's co-design efforts level in YC model. Thirdly, regardless of there being pirated products in the information market or not, the manufacturer's market share when the manufacturer chooses the user co-design is lower than the manufacturer's market share while the manufacturer does not choose the user co-design. Finally, regardless of there being pirated products in the information market or not, when the quality of commercial information products is low, the price of the commercial information products as the manufacturer chooses co-design is lower than the price when the manufacturer does not choose co-design. When the quality of commercial information products is high, the price of the commercial information products as the manufacturer chooses co-design is higher than the price when the manufacturer does not choose co-design.