| 供应商部分主导私人电子市场Stackelberg博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 李培勤. 供应商部分主导私人电子市场Stackelberg博弈[J]. 工业工程与管理, 2009, 14(4) |
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| 作者姓名： | 李培勤 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,安泰管理学院,上海,200052;华东政法大学,商学院,上海,201620 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金，国家自然科学基金，上海市哲学社会科学课题，国家自然科学基金青年基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 私人电子市场(PEM)是一个封闭的网络,具有高度灵敏的信息共享、高协调能力及保密性强等优点.探讨"一对二"结构下的供应链Stackelberg博弈,在构建PEM后供应商主导地位将减弱,据此分析了三种情况下供应商的批发价格及供应链各变量的变化规律.得出结论是,当供应商降为部分主导时,供应链效率最低, PEM拥有者的采购价格最低.随后通过数值分析得到,随着生产成本两项参数的同时增大,PEM拥有者的最优订货量、非PEM拥有者的最优订货量和最优收益、供应商的最优收益等均逐渐减小,而PEM拥有者的最优收益却逐渐增大.
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| 关 键 词： | 私人电子市场 Stackelberg博弈 供应商主导 批发价格 最优收益 最优订货量 |
A Stackelberg Model in Private Electronic Markets with Supplier's Weaker Dominant Position |
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| LI Pei-qin. A Stackelberg Model in Private Electronic Markets with Supplier's Weaker Dominant Position[J]. Industrial Engineering and Management, 2009, 14(4) |
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| Authors: | LI Pei-qin |
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| Affiliation: | 1.Antai College of Economics & Management;Shanghai Jiaotong University;Shanghai 200052;China;2.Business School;East China University of Political Science and Law;Shanghai 201620;China |
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| Abstract: | Private electronic markets(PEM) are closed networks which have lots of virtues such as sensitive information sharing,high coordination capacity and high security,etc.This paper studies a Stackelberg model in PEM.Being a leader before setting PEM,supplier will have a weaker dominant position because the PEM owner's position becomes stronger.Through comparing three situations,in which the optimal order quantity,optimal revenues and supplier's wholesale price will be different,it concludes that both supply cha... |
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| Keywords: | private electronic markets stackelberg game supplier's dominant position wholesale price optimal revenue optimal order quantity |
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