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房地产开发商Cartel联盟合作博弈的稳定性分析
引用本文:黄武军,许维胜,刘天虎,吴启迪. 房地产开发商Cartel联盟合作博弈的稳定性分析[J]. 计算机工程与应用, 2009, 45(26): 12-15. DOI: 10.3778/j.issn.1002-8331.2009.26.004
作者姓名:黄武军  许维胜  刘天虎  吴启迪
作者单位:同济大学经济与管理学院,上海,200092;同济大学电子与信息工程学院,上海,200092
基金项目:国家重点基础研究发展规划(973) 
摘    要:从经济博弈的角度对房地产开发商Cartel联盟的稳定性进行了分析。首先利用古诺博弈模型分析了开发商的行为及收益均衡,通过比较古诺均衡收益与Cartel联盟收益的大小,分析了开发商形成Cartel联盟的动因。随后引入干预函数,从博弈论的角度分析了开发商Cartel联盟的均衡点及不稳定性,通过介入惩罚函数来强化Cartel联盟的稳定性,实现了精炼子博弈Nash均衡。最后提出政策建议,以限制Cartel联盟所形成的房地产市场垄断行为。

关 键 词:Cartel联盟  合作博弈  稳定集
收稿时间:2009-06-08
修稿时间:2009-7-10 

Stability analysis of Cartel alliance cooperative games of developer of real estate
HUANG Wu-jun,XU Wei-sheng,LIU Tian-hu,WU Qi-di. Stability analysis of Cartel alliance cooperative games of developer of real estate[J]. Computer Engineering and Applications, 2009, 45(26): 12-15. DOI: 10.3778/j.issn.1002-8331.2009.26.004
Authors:HUANG Wu-jun  XU Wei-sheng  LIU Tian-hu  WU Qi-di
Affiliation:1.School of Economics & Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China 2.School of Electronics and Information Engineering,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China
Abstract:The paper analyzes the stability of Cartel alliance of developer of real estate with relevant theory of economic games. At first,the behavior and profit equilibrium of developer with cournot games model are analyzed,and researches the cause for the formation of Cartel alliance through the comparison of profit between cournot equilibrium and Cartel alliance.And then,by adopting interference function,the equilibrium point and instability of Cartel alliance of developer is analyzed,the sub-game perfect Nash eq...
Keywords:Cartel alliance  cooperative games  stable set
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