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城市拆迁中群体性突发事件发生机制的博弈分析
引用本文:张晓兵,张薇,马艳.城市拆迁中群体性突发事件发生机制的博弈分析[J].江苏建材,2012(2):39-41.
作者姓名:张晓兵  张薇  马艳
作者单位:1. 安阳师范学院建筑工程学院,河南安阳,455002
2. 安阳市建筑设计研究院,河南安阳,455000
基金项目:河南省科技发展软科学规划项目(编号:112400450217);安阳师范学院大学生创新基金项目
摘    要:我国城市化进程为经济发展起到了巨大的推动作用.但是由于城市拆迁补偿等问题处理不当引发了大量的群体性突发事件。文章运用动态博弈模型分析了城市拆迁过程中地方政府与住户之间的动态博弈和利益分配过程,通过甘肃陇南事件进行实证分析,最后提出关于减少城市拆迁引发群体性突发事件、完善城市拆迁和补偿机制的政策建议。

关 键 词:城市拆迁  群体性突发事件  动态博弈  应急管理

Game analysis of mass unexpected events in city demolition
Authors:Zhang Xiaobing  Zhang Wei  Ma Yan
Affiliation:Zhang Xiaobing, Zhang Wei, Ma Yan
Abstract:Chinese urbanization has played a huge role in promoting our economic development, but also brought a lot of crises, especially the emergency due to improper handling in the demolition. In this paper, the game theory is used to analyze the process of the game and the distribution of benefits between the government and households. It also describes the root reasons of unexpected incidents caused by demolition and makes some recommendations accordingly. The purpose is to avoid similar incidents from happening again, so as to ensure the stability of the process of urbanization.
Keywords:city demolition  mass unexpected events  dynamic game  emergency management
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