| 电子商务环境下耐用品制造商和零售商策略的博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 彭静,林杰,林正.电子商务环境下耐用品制造商和零售商策略的博弈[J].工业工程,2014,17(6):89-94. |
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| 作者姓名： | 彭静 林杰 林正 |
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| 作者单位： | (1. 同济大学 经济管理学院, 上海 200092； 2. 浙江农林大学 信息工程学院, 浙江 临安 311300；
3. 浙江省特种设备检验研究院, 浙江 杭州 310020;4.浙江省林业智能监测与信息技术研究重点实验室，浙江 临安 311300) |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目(71071114)；教育部人文社科研究规划项目(11YJC630216)；广东省自然科学基金项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 构造了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两周期双渠道耐用品销售模型，制造商同时通过零售商和自有电子直销渠道销售产品。通过求解每个周期优化问题的Kuhn-Tucker条件，得到供应链成员每个周期的最优策略和利润。通过与单一渠道比较分析，发现产品的耐用性和电子直销渠道的成本影响着双方的最优策略，当制造商电子渠道的销售成本高于一定门槛时，制造商开通电子渠道，但不接收订单获利会更多。通过分析还发现当制造商电子渠道的销售成本较高时，制造商开通电子直销渠道，零售商将获利。
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| 关 键 词： | 耐用品 竞争策略 博弈 双渠道 |
A Game Theory Analysis of Competitive Strategies of Durable Goods Manufacturer and Dealer under the Electronic Commerce Environment |
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| Peng Jing,Lin Jie,Lin Zheng.A Game Theory Analysis of Competitive Strategies of Durable Goods Manufacturer and Dealer under the Electronic Commerce Environment[J].Industrial Engineering Journal,2014,17(6):89-94. |
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| Authors: | Peng Jing Lin Jie Lin Zheng |
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| Affiliation: | (1. School of Economics and Management，Tongji University，Shanghai 200092，China;
2. School of Information Engineering, Zhejiang A&F University, Lin′an 311300, China；;
3. Zhejiang Provincial Special Equipment Inspection and Research Institute, Hangzhou 310020, China;
4. Zhejiang Provincial Key Laboratory of Forestry Intelligent Monitoring and Information Technology Research,Lin′an 311300, China) |
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| Abstract: | A two-period dual channel model is considered in which a manufacturer sells a durable product directly through both a manufacturer-owned e-channel and an independent dealer who sells products directly to consumers. By solving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the optimization problem of each period, each supply chain player’s optimal decisions and profits are obtained. The results show that the product durability and direct selling cost have an important impact on player’s optimal strategies in a dual channel supply chain. When the direct selling cost exceeds a certain threshold, it is optimal for the manufacturer to open an e-channel even when there are no products sales through it. Moreover, the dealer may benefit from the manufacturer’s encroachment when the direct selling cost is higher. |
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| Keywords: | durable goods competitive strategy game theory dual channel |
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