计及爬坡率申报的电力市场博弈分析

为了充分发挥具有快速爬坡能力的机组的性能,介绍了一种考虑机组爬坡策略的电力市场博弈模型.基于市场统一出清、负荷需求无弹性及发电商按边际成本报价等前提,讨论了发电商爬坡成本及降低爬坡申报值的可能性与限制措施；分析了在非线性边际成本时的发电商提高爬坡申报值的博弈行为,利用置换法结合图形分析得出其Nash均衡解析解.算例表明,发电商合理申报爬坡率能够有效降低市场出清价格和系统购电费用,减少高成本机组的运行与不必要的开停机,促进市场稳定.

Game analysis of electricity markets considering bidding of ramp-rate

A game model considering the ramping strategy of the units in electricity markets was presented to give full play to the units’  rapid ramping capabilities. Based on the uniform-price auction, inelastic demand and marginal cost pricing, the ramping cost and the probability and restrictions of the decreasing of ramp-rate bidding were discussed. The analytic solutions of the Nash equilibrium of the increasing of ramp-rate bidding was obtained by replacement method combining graphic analysis under the condition that the marginal cost was nonlinear. The results of examples showed that reasonable ramp-rate bidding of the generators can reduce  the clearing price and purchase cost of the market, the operation of the high cost unit, and the unnecessary unit up-down effectively, and enhance the stability of the market.