| 一种扩展的理性秘密分享机制 |
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| 引用本文： | 林冬梅.一种扩展的理性秘密分享机制[J].计算机工程,2012,38(16):153-156. |
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| 作者姓名： | 林冬梅 |
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| 作者单位： | 鲁东大学现代教育技术部 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(60875039) |
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| 摘 要： | 采用异步通信方式，使参与者轮流采取行动以避免空洞威胁，并结合参与者的通信代价，提出一种扩展的理性秘密分享机制。将参与者信誉效用值引入到该机制中，抑制参与者的不诚实行为。分析结果表明，该机制存在序贯均衡，并且能保证在参与者不偏离序贯均衡的情况下实现秘密分享。
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈论 空洞威胁 理性秘密分享 信誉 序贯均衡 |
| 收稿时间： | 2011-11-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2011-12-08 |
Extended Rational Secret Sharing Mechanism |
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| LIN Dong-mei.Extended Rational Secret Sharing Mechanism[J].Computer Engineering,2012,38(16):153-156. |
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| Authors: | LIN Dong-mei |
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| Affiliation: | LIN Dong-mei(Department of Modern Education Technology,Ludong University,Yantai 264025,China) |
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| Abstract: | An extended rational secret sharing mechanism using non-simutaneous communication channels is proposed in order to avoid empty threat when players alternately take actions.To refrain effectively the dishonest behavior,reputation utility values are introduced into the new mechanism.Analysis results indicate that there is a sequential equilibrium to guarantee that players can realize secret sharing without deviating from the sequential equilibrium. |
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| Keywords: | game theory empty threat rational secret sharing reputation sequential equilibrium |
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