输变电工程基于委托代理结算模式下的激励机制

随着国家电网公司输变电工程结算工作的发展，如何提高结算效率，减少审计风险，以达到时间节点和结算深度的要求显得非常重要。介绍了委托第三方进行结算的模式，并给出详细的委托结算流程图，解决了结算时间较紧的问题。基于博弈论中的委托代理理论对如何激励造价咨询单位的积极性进行探讨，构建了固定报酬模式和绝对绩效模式的委托代理激励模型，并给出了其求解方法，为结算咨询费用的计算提供理论支撑。算例表明，所建立的委托代理博弈模型具有较大的应用价值，可为新结算模式下咨询费用的计算提供依据，也为我国输变电工程结算模式的发展提供了有益的启示。

Incentive System based on Principal-Agent Settlement Mode in Power Transmission and Distribution Project

With the speeding up of transmission project settlement in State Grid Corporation,improving settlement efficiency and reducing audit risk are of importance in order to achieve the time node requirements and the settlement depth.In this paper,a mode of delegating a third party to settle the account is introduced,and the detailed flow chart of entrust settlement also presented,where the settlement time is shortened.The incentives for the cost advisory unit is discussed based on the principal-agent theory in the game theory,as a result that the fixed payment model and the absolute performance incentive model as well as their solution methods are presented,providing theoretical support for calculating the settlement of consulting fees.It is shown from the examples that the model established in this paper is very useful,which could provide basis for the calculation of consulting fees and also inspire the healthy development of settlement patterns of the power transmission project in China.