Strongly secure identity-based authenticated key agreement protocols |
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Authors: | Liang NiAuthor Vitae Gongliang ChenAuthor VitaeJianhua LiAuthor Vitae Yanyan HaoAuthor Vitae |
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Affiliation: | a School of Information Security Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 800 Dongchuan Road, Shanghai 200240, China b Experiment Management Center, Zhongzhou University, Zhengzhou 450044, China |
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Abstract: | In this paper, we present a strongly secure identity-based (ID-based) two-party authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol, which captures all basic desirable security properties including master key forward secrecy, ephemeral secrets reveal resistance and so on, and is provably secure in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. The security of the protocol can be reduced to the standard Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Our scheme is secure as long as each party has at least one uncompromised secret. Also, we give a strongly secure variant of the protocol. The variant has a much lower computational overhead than the original scheme, while its security relies on the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Currently, there are few ID-based AKA protocols that are provably secure in the strong eCK model. Compared with previous ID-based AKA schemes, our protocols have advantages over them in security or efficiency. |
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