| 互补性资产分布与创新者价值获取 |
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| 引用本文： | 杜义飞 李仕明. 互补性资产分布与创新者价值获取[J]. 控制与决策, 2010, 25(6): 808-813 |
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| 作者姓名： | 杜义飞 李仕明 |
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| 作者单位： | 电子科技大学,经济与管理学院,成都,610054 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金青年基金项目(70802009) |
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| 摘 要： | 通过建立Biform两阶段博弈模型,分析互补性资产分布与创新者价值获取之间的关系;通过以创新者的最小剩余代替其价值分配下界,以边际价值增加代替其价值分配上界的区间偏好条件,确定创新者在第1阶段的战略选择偏好;给定创新产品的数量,创新者价值获取大小受互补性资产总量、创新竞争差值、独立互补性资产方数量和总的创新竞争剩余的影响;进而,利用创新者偏向与所有可获取的独立互补性资产集合建立创新价值创造联盟.
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| 关 键 词： | 创新者价值获取 互补性资产 分布 Biform博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2009-08-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2009-11-20 |
Distribution of complementary assets and value appropriation of innovators |
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| DU Yi-fei,LI Shi-ming. Distribution of complementary assets and value appropriation of innovators[J]. Control and Decision, 2010, 25(6): 808-813 |
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| Authors: | DU Yi-fei LI Shi-ming |
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| Affiliation: | DU Yi-fei,LI Shi-ming School of Management , Economics,University of Electronic Science , Technology of China,Chengdu 610054,China |
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| Abstract: | The relationship between the distribution of complementary assets and the value appropriation of innovator is analyzed by establishment of two-stage Biform game model.The interval preference condition,whose lower bound of value appropriation is replaced by the minimum residual of innovation and the upper bound is replaced by marginal value added,determines the choice of preference for innovator in the first phase of the model.The quantity of innovation product is given,and the value appropriation of the inn... |
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| Keywords: | Value appropriation of innovation Complementary assets Distribution Biform game |
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