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奖惩机制下闭环供应链的成本共担-利润共享契约
引用本文:王文宾,丁军飞,达庆利.奖惩机制下闭环供应链的成本共担-利润共享契约[J].控制与决策,2019,34(4):843-850.
作者姓名:王文宾  丁军飞  达庆利
作者单位:中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116,中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116,东南大学经济管理学院, 南京211189
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71102164, 71601099);四川省电子商务与现代物流研究中心项目(DSWL17-1);四川循环经济研究中心规划项目(XHJJ-1704).
摘    要:研究政府奖惩机制下闭环供应链的成本共担-利润共享契约,分别建立集中式决策情形和分散式决策情形下的奖惩机制下有无成本共担-利润共享契约的闭环供应链决策模型.研究表明:随着政府奖惩力度的提高,产品的零售价降低,回购价、回收率和回收商的利润均提高,但制造商的利润与目标回收率有关;随着回收商成本共担比例和分享利润比例的提高,零售价提高,但总小于无契约的情形,回收率降低,但总大于无契约的情形;回购价随着回收商成本共担比例的提高而提高,随着其利润分享比例的提高而降低;制造商总能从成本共担-利润共享契约中获益,而当成本共担比例适中、利润共享比例较大时,回收商才愿意接受该契约,此时,成本共担-利润共享契约生效且能够协调闭环供应链.

关 键 词:成本共担-利润共享契约  奖惩机制  闭环供应链  决策  回收率  协调

Cost-profit sharing contract for a closed-loop supply chain under reward-penalty mechanism
WANG Wen-bin,DING Jun-fei and DA Qing-li.Cost-profit sharing contract for a closed-loop supply chain under reward-penalty mechanism[J].Control and Decision,2019,34(4):843-850.
Authors:WANG Wen-bin  DING Jun-fei and DA Qing-li
Affiliation:School of Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221116,China,School of Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221116,China and School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China
Abstract:This paper investigates the cost-profit sharing contract for a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) under the reward-penalty mechanism(RPM), and then respectively develops the centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain decision models under penalty mechanism with and without the cost-profit sharing contract. The results show that, with the increase of the reward-penalty intensity, the retail price of product decreases; all the buy-back price, the collection rate and the collector''s profit increase, while the manufacturer''s profit relates to the target collection rate; with the increase of the cost-sharing ratio and the profit-sharing ratio, the retail price increases, which is always lower than that without the contract, and the collection rate decreases, but is always higher than that without the contract; the buy-back price increases as the cost-sharing ratio increases, while decreases as the profit-sharing ratio increases. The manufacturer can always benefit from the cost-profit sharing contract, but the collector will not accept the contract unless the cost-sharing ratio is mild and the profit-sharing ratio is large. This also indicates that the cost-profit sharing contract takes effect and can coordinate the CLSC in this condition.
Keywords:
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