奖惩机制下闭环供应链的成本共担-利润共享契约

研究政府奖惩机制下闭环供应链的成本共担-利润共享契约,分别建立集中式决策情形和分散式决策情形下的奖惩机制下有无成本共担-利润共享契约的闭环供应链决策模型.研究表明:随着政府奖惩力度的提高,产品的零售价降低,回购价、回收率和回收商的利润均提高,但制造商的利润与目标回收率有关;随着回收商成本共担比例和分享利润比例的提高,零售价提高,但总小于无契约的情形,回收率降低,但总大于无契约的情形;回购价随着回收商成本共担比例的提高而提高,随着其利润分享比例的提高而降低;制造商总能从成本共担-利润共享契约中获益,而当成本共担比例适中、利润共享比例较大时,回收商才愿意接受该契约,此时,成本共担-利润共享契约生效且能够协调闭环供应链.

Cost-profit sharing contract for a closed-loop supply chain under reward-penalty mechanism

This paper investigates the cost-profit sharing contract for a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) under the reward-penalty mechanism(RPM), and then respectively develops the centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain decision models under penalty mechanism with and without the cost-profit sharing contract. The results show that, with the increase of the reward-penalty intensity, the retail price of product decreases; all the buy-back price, the collection rate and the collector''s profit increase, while the manufacturer''s profit relates to the target collection rate; with the increase of the cost-sharing ratio and the profit-sharing ratio, the retail price increases, which is always lower than that without the contract, and the collection rate decreases, but is always higher than that without the contract; the buy-back price increases as the cost-sharing ratio increases, while decreases as the profit-sharing ratio increases. The manufacturer can always benefit from the cost-profit sharing contract, but the collector will not accept the contract unless the cost-sharing ratio is mild and the profit-sharing ratio is large. This also indicates that the cost-profit sharing contract takes effect and can coordinate the CLSC in this condition.