企业资本预算中的信息租金与投资终止机制研究

由于在信息不对称情形下，总部管理者．必须依赖自利的部门管理者提供关于项目利润的私人信息，在审核成本很高，无法验证分部管理者的类型时，基于信息租金与投资终止成本的权衡，总部管理者会选择一个投资终止的最优机制，以达到总部管理者净利润最大。

The Research on Information Rents and the Mechanism of Termination of Investment in Capital Budgeting within Firm

In realistic capital budgeting,headquarters should not naively apply the net present value rule,because the net present value rule does not accord with the realistic capital budgeting that characterize with information asymmetry.Due to the information asymmetry,headquarters must depend on the report of self-interested division managers with private information about the project profit.So,if there is a high audit cost and no possibility of verifying the state of division managers,based on the trade off between information rents and cost of termination of investment,the headquarters usually exert optimal mechanism of termination of investment to maximize the headquarters' net profit.