远期合约助长发电商默契串谋的机理分析

远期合约作为降低市场力的有效手段之一,已广泛应用于许多国家的电力市场。但是,在日复一日重复报价的情况下,发电商之间为了避免价格战有可能形成某种默契串谋,人为造成电价上升。该文首先建立了包含远期合约时电力市场均衡的EPEC模型;然后构造了发电商形成默契串谋的随机触发策略。仿真结果说明了远期合约的存在的确有助于降低发电商的市场力;但是发电商也可以利用远期合约实现默契串谋,为监管机构有针对性地制定措施以避免默契串谋,限制市场权力提供了理论依据。

Mechanism analysis of forward contracts facilitating generator''''s tacit collusion

As one of the effective tools to mitigate market power in power markets,forward contracts have been widely used in many countries.But when generators bid repeatedly day by day,they can form tacit collusion to avoid price competition.First,an EPEC(Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constrains)model is developed to analyze the power markets which settled both in real time market and forward market.Then a stochastic trigger strategy is constructed based on infinite repeated game theory.The numerical example shows that on the one hand forward contracts can mitigate market power dramatically,but on the other hand it facilitates generators to form tacit collusion.It is a useful tool for policy makers to design proper policy to cure the curse of market power in the future.