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带有订单转保理的供应链金融的收益共享博弈模型
引用本文:南江霞,李帅,张茂军.带有订单转保理的供应链金融的收益共享博弈模型[J].控制与决策,2023,38(6):1745-1752.
作者姓名:南江霞  李帅  张茂军
作者单位:苏州科技大学 商学院,江苏 苏州 215009;桂林电子科技大学 数学与计算科学学院, 广西 桂林 541004
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(72061007,71961004);苏州科技大学科研启动项目(332111807,332111801);江苏省社会科学基金项目(22GLB009);江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(KYCX22_3248).
摘    要:当作为供应商的中小企业出现了严重的财务困境问题时,急需有效融资工具和创新管理模式加以解决.订单转保理可以令资质良好的零售商为资金短缺的供应商提供融资担保,有效解决供应商的订单减少和融资难的问题.然而,分散决策的订单转保理融资模式,使得做担保的零售商的收益降低,不能明显改善供应链效率.针对此问题,研究订单转保理模式下的供应链协调模型,并重点研究由供应商与零售商组成的二级供应链的订单转保理收益共享模型.研究发现:收益共享决策模型供应链总收益小于集中决策供应链总收益,大于分散决策的供应链总收益,表明供应链成员相互合作程度越高,越有利于供应链发展,从而表明协调在供应链中发挥重要作用.然而,集中决策模型只能得到供应链最优总收益,无法得到供应商和零售商的最优收益.收益共享模型不仅能够提高产品订货量,降低产品批发价格,增加供应商和零售商的收益,而且通过最优的收益共享系数可以得到供应商和零售商的最优收益.收益共享机制能够为供应商和零售商共赢协调发展提供新的运作管理模式.

关 键 词:供应链金融  保理融资  Stackelberg博弈  收益共享

Revenue sharing game model of supply chain finance with order-to-factoring financing
NAN Jiang-xi,LI Shuai,ZHANG Mao-jun.Revenue sharing game model of supply chain finance with order-to-factoring financing[J].Control and Decision,2023,38(6):1745-1752.
Authors:NAN Jiang-xi  LI Shuai  ZHANG Mao-jun
Affiliation:School of Business,Suzhou University of Science and Technology,Suzhou 215009,China;School of Mathematics and Computing Science,Guilin University of Electronic Technology,Guilin 541004,China
Abstract:At the present environment of the ongoing epidemic situation, the small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs), as suppliers, are experiencing serious financial distress problems that urgently need to be addressed by effective financing tools and innovative management models. Order-to-factoring allows the well-qualified retailer to provide financing guarantees for the supplier who are short of funds, and effectively solve the problem of reduced orders and difficult financing for the supplier. However, the decentralised decision making model of order-to-factor financing reduces the revenue for the retailer who acts as a guarantor and does not significantly improve supply chain efficiency. For this problem, this paper examines a supply chain coordination model with the order-to-factoring mode, focusing on the revenue sharing model for a secondary supply chain that consists of the supplier and the retailer under the order-to-factoring. Research shows that the total benefits of the supply chain under the revenue sharing model are smaller than the total revenue of the supply chain under the centralized decision making, and are larger than the total revenue of the supply chain under the decentralized decision making. It is indicated that the higher the level of cooperation between supply chain members, the more beneficial it is to the development of the supply chain, thus demonstrating that coordination plays an important role in the supply chain. However, the centralised decision model only obtains the optimal total revenue of the supply chain, without being able to obtain the optimal revenue of the supplier and the retailer, respectively. The revenue sharing model not only increases the product order quantity, reduces the wholesale price of the product and increases the benefits for the supplier and retailer, but also obtains the optimal revenue of the supplier and the retailer through the optimal revenue sharing coefficient. The revenue sharing mechanism provides a new operational management model for the win-win coordination of suppliers and retailers.
Keywords:
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