基于博弈视角和实物期权理论的养老机构 PPP 项目运营补贴机制研究

在人口老龄化大背景下，老年人对机构养老的需求与日俱增，将政府和社会资本合作（PPP）模式与养老机构开发运营相结合，有利于优化养老资源配置，推进普惠养老，具有其可行性和合理性。提出三方共赢的养老机构 PPP 项目政府补贴激励机制，基于讨价还价博弈理论对政府和私人投资者进行收益分配，构建补贴比例计算模型。考虑可变补贴的不确定性所带来的项目潜在价值，引入实物期权理论，构建项目期权价值计算模型，科学测算项目的潜在价值，根据计算结果对项目的特许期进行更为合理的决策。并通过实例验证所构建的补贴机制和特许期计算模型的适用性，为养老机构 PPP 项目的运营机制设计和科学决策提供了方法论的参考。

Research on the Operating Subsidy Mechanism of Endowment Institution inPublic-Private Partnerships Based on Game Theory and Real Option Theory

Under the circumstances of population aging and the increasing demand for institutional care，combining the endowmentinstitutions with public-private partnerships （PPPs） is feasible and reasonable. It helps optimize the allocation of old-age serviceresources and promote inclusive old-age service. Based on the bargaining game theory，a multi-wins incentive subsidies mechanismfor endowment institutions in PPPs is proposed. The profits of government and private investors are allocated to construct a subsidyratio calculation model. Considering the potential value brought by the uncertainty of variable subsidies，real option theory is adoptedto establish a calculation model of project value. The model can scientifically estimate the potential value of the project，which helpsmake reasonable decisions on the concession period. Ultimately，an empirical analysis is carried out to verify the applicability of thesubsidy mechanism and concession period decision model. The study provides a methodological reference for the operationmechanism design and scientific decision-making of endowment institutions in PPPs