我国国有部门与非国有部门工资决定机制差异的实证研究

本文利用微观调查数据对我国国有部门与非国有部门工资决定机制的差异进行了实证研究。研究发现,在市场化改革过程中,不论是机关事业单位还是国有企业,其人力资本的收益率不断提高,这表明人力资本的报酬机制在国有部门的工资决定中得到了强化。但是与非国有部门工资决定模式相比较,国有部门的工资决定依然带有较强的制度化特征。进一步对工资差异进行的布兰德-瓦哈卡(Blinder-Oaxaca)分解表明,国有部门与非国有部门之间长期存在一定程度的工资溢价。溢价的存在意味着工资对劳动生产率(或者说人力资本水平)的偏离,同时也意味着同质劳动在两个部门得到不同的报酬,即"同工不同酬"。这种现象的存在必然会降低劳动力市场的效率,同时也会带来资源的浪费。

An Empirical Study on Differentials of Wage Determination Mechanism between State-sector and Non State-sector in China

This paper studies the differentials of wage determination mechanism between state-sector and non state-sector in China using household survey data.The study shows that dur- ing the course of market reform,the human capital return both of state-organs and of enterprises improve increasingly.This means the role of human capital in state-sector′s wage determination is strengthened.While comparing to non state-sector,there are still some institutional attributes in the mechanism.Moreover,the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition indicates there are wage premium between state-sector and non state-sector for a long time. The existence of wage premium means the wage deviates from the labor productivity(or the level of human capital),and it also means"same labor but different earnings"This phenomenon will damage the labor market′s efficien- cy,and cause the resources waste.