产品差异度与双寡头厂商行为的实验分析

我们沿着Bertrand理论渊源构建模型,并以此为基础设计实验,在实验室环境中检验产品差异度与双寡头厂商的行为。论文首先分析模型的理论值,其次在实验市场中进行了设置检验。实验结果表明:(1)产品差异度越小,双寡头厂商的博弈平均价格就越低,该价格在重复博弈纳什均衡区间的中间价格附近波动;(2)博弈期数越多,博弈双方的冲突反而越大,这与俗定理预测相悖;(3)对背叛行为的惩罚具有普遍性,惩罚策略主要是针锋相对,惩罚强度随产品差异度减小而增强;(4)产品差异度对共谋的稳定性影响不显著,这与理论预测相悖;(5)折现与平均价格及共谋的关系模糊。

Tacit Collusion of Firm in Experimental Duopoly with Product Differentiation

We study competitive and collusive behaviors of firms in experimental duopoly with product differentiation.First,we analyze Bertrand model with product differentiation,then make experimental test in experimental duopoly.Experimental results show:(1) less product dif- ferentiation,lower average game price,and average game prices fluctuate around middle price of Nash supergame equilibrium interval;(2) more game periods,more strong conflict,and this is inconsistent with Folk Theorem;(3) punishment toward defective behaviors is universal behav- ior;punishment strategy is Tit For Tat,punishment grade is increased with decreasing product differentiation;(4) product differentiation is not significant impact with collusion stableness; (5) discount is not significant impact with average game price and collusion.