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基于合作博弈的风水火联合运营研究
引用本文:周斌,崔雪,邹晨露,刘洋,高健. 基于合作博弈的风水火联合运营研究[J]. 电测与仪表, 2019, 56(6): 69-75
作者姓名:周斌  崔雪  邹晨露  刘洋  高健
作者单位:武汉大学 电气工程学院,武汉,430072;武汉大学 电气工程学院,武汉,430072;武汉大学 电气工程学院,武汉,430072;武汉大学 电气工程学院,武汉,430072;武汉大学 电气工程学院,武汉,430072
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(51177112) 根据国家能源局发布的《2016年度全国可再生能源电力发展监测评价报告》显示,到2016年底,全国可再生能源发电装机容量占全部电力装机的34.6%,而全部可再生能源电力消纳量占全社会用电量的比重为25.4%,在一些水电或风电较丰富的地区,出现了不同程度的“弃风”“弃水”现象[1]。
摘    要:近年来,电力需求增速有所放缓,导致可再生能源弃用问题较为严重,为可再生能源出让发电空间的火电企业生存问题亦日益凸显,解决这一系列矛盾迫在眉睫。论文提出了市场化情况下风水火联合运营模式,火电将发电空间转让给风电、水电并提供辅助服务以实现联盟效益最大化,基于合作博弈理论对联盟效益进行再分配以实现个体效用最大化。通过算例分析了不同联盟模式下的联盟经济效益和环境效益以及不同分配策略下风水火联合运营各参与人的分配效用,并依据MDP指标分析了不同分配策略对联盟参与人的吸引力。结果表明风水火三方联合运营可以实现联盟经济效益和环境效益最大化,选用夏普利值分配策略作为联盟效用分配方案最为合理。风水火联合运营可有效解决弃风弃水问题并改善火电企业运营状况,保障了电力结构低碳化平稳过渡,为促进火电与可再生能源合作提供了理论依据。

关 键 词:联合运营  合作博弈  分配策略  夏普利值  MDP指标
收稿时间:2018-02-06
修稿时间:2018-02-06

Research on Wind-hydro-thermal Power Joint Operation Based on Cooperative Game Theory
Zhou Bin,Cui Xue,Zou Chenlu,Liu Yang and Gao Jian. Research on Wind-hydro-thermal Power Joint Operation Based on Cooperative Game Theory[J]. Electrical Measurement & Instrumentation, 2019, 56(6): 69-75
Authors:Zhou Bin  Cui Xue  Zou Chenlu  Liu Yang  Gao Jian
Affiliation:School of Electrical Engineering,Wuhan University,School of Electrical Engineering,Wuhan University,School of Electrical Engineering,Wuhan University,School of Electrical Engineering,Wuhan University,School of Electrical Engineering,Wuhan University
Abstract:In recent years, the growth rate of electricity demand has slowed down, resulting in the problem of serious renewable energy abandoning. Thus, the survival problem of thermal power enterprises which transfer generation rights to renewable energy is becoming more and more prominent. So it is imminent to solve this series of contradictions. This paper presents the joint operation mode of wind power and hydropower and thermal power. In order to maximize the alliance benefit, the thermal power transfers the generation rights to the wind power and hydropower, and provides auxiliary services. Then, maximize the individual benefit by reallocating the alliance benefit. It is analyzed and compared in this paper that the economic and environmental benefits of alliance under different modes and the distribution utility of the participants in the joint operation under different allocation strategies. And based on the MDP indicator, the attractiveness of different allocation strategies to participants is analyzed. The results show that wind-hydro-thermal power joint operation can maximize economic and environmental benefits of the alliance and that shapley value is the most reasonable allocation strategy. Wind-hydro-thermal power joint operation can effectively solve the problem of renewable energy abandoning and thermal power management, guarantee the smooth transition of low carbonization of power system, and provide a theoretical basis for the cooperation between thermal power and renewable energy.
Keywords:joint  operation, cooperative  game, allocation  strategy, shapley  value, modified  disruption propensity.
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